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1. Introduction 
 
Digital  technologies  have  had  and  continue  to 
have profound effects on multiple facets of 
societal life. The changes range from the trivial 
to the momentous – from online shopping, through 
the emergence of new global value chains and 
transactions,  to  the  very  ways  we  work  and 
write, create, distribute and access information 
− bringing distant geographical locations within 
instantaneous reach, groups of millions of people 
organised within hours, and encyclopaedias and 
virtual libraries produced on a collaborative basis. 
These modifications are by no means quantitative 
only – pertaining, for instance, to the number of 
Internet users or to the contribution of online trade 
to gross domestic product (GDP) and economic 
growth   (OECD,   2013;   UNCTAD,   2012;   USITC, 
2013) – but also have a qualitative character and 
significantly impact  on  many  separate  areas  of 
society as well as on society as a whole (Benkler, 
2006; Chander, 2013). 
 
The changes brought about by digital technologies 
have   unsurprisingly   triggered   regulatory 
responses at all levels of governance that affect, 
to varying degrees, the existing regimes for 
telecommunications, audiovisual media services, 
and copyright, to mention but a few (Primo Braga, 
2005; Drake and Wilson, 2008). National policies 
were the first to be redesigned, but because of the 
inherent “globalness” of the digital environment, 
many of the solutions need to be situated at the 
international level – either framed as an add-on 
to existing agreements (such the Internet Treaties 
adopted in 1996 under the World Intellectual 
Property Organization, WIPO) or entirely new 
institutional solutions (such as the Internet 
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, 
ICANN). It should also be borne in mind that in 
cyberspace, local regulatory actions cannot be 
neatly isolated and often have worldwide spillovers 
(Bellia et al., 2011). 
 
It should be underscored in this context that 
whereas  it  is  evident  that  digital  technologies 
have had an impact on the economy as well as on 
social and cultural practices, they have at least 
equally strongly affected the law and patterns of 
governance in general (Bellia et al., 2011; Burri 
and Cottier, 2012; Goldsmith and Wu, 2008). Legal 
institutions face various challenges, related, among 
other things, to design and enforcement. Many of 
the existing rules no longer provide appropriate 
answers.   Digital   technology   undermines,   for 
instance,   traditional   perceptions   of   copyright 
and exclusivity. It renders classic distinctions 
between  goods  and  services  obsolete,  as  these 
are now commonly integrated, especially with the 
documented intensified trend of “servicification”. 
 
At the same time, as digital technologies are 
increasingly mobilised within nation states as key 
drivers of innovation and growth, the danger of 
regulatory activism and of often burdensome and 
imbalanced regulation is also clear and present. As 
recent evidence shows, there has been a wave of 
measures, both in domestic and external policies, 
which protect local industries and may significantly 
inhibit free digital trade (USITC, 2013). 
 
International economic law (IEL) has so far not 
reacted in a forward-looking manner to the digital 
revolution (Burri and Cottier, 2012). If we look at 
the  rules  and  commitments  under  the  auspices 
of the World Trade Organization (WTO) as the 
mainstay  of  IEL,  no  real  advance  whatsoever 
has been made since the Uruguay Round (1986– 
1994), and very little can be expected even in a 
successful post-Doha scenario. In contrast to the so 
far fruitless multilateral efforts, there have been 
some advances in bilateral and regional venues - 
not only in terms of further trade liberalisation 
but also in terms of overcoming analogue–digital 
disparities and creating new rules. Yet, even here, 
the developments have only been incremental, 
catching up with technological advances in discrete 
fields  –  where   some   business  interests  were 
pressing – while still falling short of true regulatory 
innovation.  The  mega-regional  trade  deals  of 
the  Trans-Pacific  Partnership  (TPP)  Agreement 
and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP) Agreement, currently under 
negotiation, may offer some new approaches and 
more detailed and better structured templates for 
addressing digital trade. Yet, the claim remains 
valid that we are still only at the beginning of 
finding and defining an appropriate transnational 
and international regulatory framework governing 
digital technologies, the associated opportunities 
and  risks.  Considering  the  growing  importance 
of digitally-fuelled innovation, the urgency of 
putting together the elements of such a regulatory 
framework has only increased. 
 
In asking whether there is a need for new multilateral 
trade rules addressing digital trade, it is perhaps 
useful to discern two types of sub-questions that 
can be raised, which necessarily call for different 
types of reform. The first relates to incremental 
adjustment of the WTO Agreements to remedy the 
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existing problems of inadequacy, inconsistency and 
legal uncertainty with regard to the burgeoning 
electronic commerce. The second set of questions 
is bolder and demands more innovative legal 
engineering.  As  digital  technologies,  and  above 
all the Internet, enter a more advanced stage of 
evolution and of integration into societal life, the 
critical question is likely to transcend issues of 
market access, elimination of tariffs or the concrete 
classification of a digital good or service, and will ask 
how fit the entire international trade governance 
system is to face the digital challenge. How can the 
entire rule structure be made sustainable as well 
as being able to anticipate impending tests further 
down the road, so that digital trade is facilitated 
and fostered? 
 
2. Mapping key issues and identifying 
challenges 
 
In addressing these questions and contemplating 
the elements of an appropriate WTO reform,1  we 
should not be too quick to forget the merits of the 
existing system. 
 
2.1. What we have 
 
The law of the WTO, despite the lack of response 
presently, and possibly in the short- to medium- 
term, possesses intrinsic flexibility and resilience, 
both in the substance and in the procedural 
mechanisms that could appropriately accommodate 
some, if not all, changes brought about by digital 
trade. The WTO is much more than the admittedly 
stalling Doha round of negotiations. Powerful 
principles,   such   as   the   most-favoured-nation 
(MFN) obligation, which apply equally to all 159 
WTO Members and operate under the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and the 
Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS), could potentially address 
technological developments better than new made- 
to-measure regulatory  acts,  often  adopted as  a 
reaction to strong vested interests, especially in 
the intellectual property (IP) domain (e.g. Gervais, 
2012; Sell, 2003). 
The GATT combined with the Information 
Technology Agreement (ITA), which represents 
about 97 per cent of world trade in information 
technology (IT) products and secures elimination 
of  duties,  provide  a  comprehensive  framework 
for trade with digital products and one of the 
deepest modes of liberalisation. The TRIPS offers 
an equally broad palette of tools for protecting 
intellectual property pertinent to IT, specifically 
addressing computer programmes and granting 
them protection as literary works under the Berne 
Convention (Article 10:1 TRIPS). Under the GATS, 
which appears to be the most pertinent set of rules in 
online trade cases, despite the “cultural exception” 
debates during the Uruguay Round (Burri, 2008), no 
services sector is excluded a priori. The existing 
rules and commitments for telecommunications 
services are particularly advanced, addressing not 
only the opening of markets but also some critical 
competition issues, access and interconnection 
(Bronckers and Larouche, 2008), which ensure a 
fairly liberal regime for the key infrastructure layer. 
There are also horizontally applicable provisions, 
such as those regarding transparency (Article III 
GATS) and domestic regulation (Article VI GATS), 
that may have the (as yet untapped) potential to 
deal with many of the digital trade concerns. 
 
In terms of evolution of norms and the presence 
of  embedded  mechanisms  of  adaptation,  the 
WTO possesses the unrivalled advantage of a 
sophisticated and relatively efficient dispute 
settlement, often dubbed the “jewel in the crown” 
of the WTO architecture (e.g. Davey, 2005). We 
find strong  evidence  in  the  WTO  jurisprudence 
for both the adeptness of the dispute settlement 
system and for the relevance of electronic 
commerce in trade conflicts. Indeed, all key GATS 
cases so far (Mexico - Telecoms,2  US - Gambling3 
and China - Publications and Audiovisual Products4) 
had a substantial  Internet-related element, and 
have had an impact on the law of the WTO, in 
clarifying its norms and advancing it further. While 
certainly less visible and less discussed, the non- 
judicial  governance  at  the  WTO  should  not  be 
underestimated.  Unfolding  in  many  committees, 
 
1    It should be noted from the outset that this paper does not address all questions related to digital trade. It does not cover the 
interface between electronic and non-electronic commerce, which raises questions of customs duties and other formalities when 
goods cross borders. Neither does it include GATS mode 4 questions related to the free movement of persons. 
2    Panel Report, Mexico – Measures Affecting Telecommunications Services (Mexico - Telecoms), WT/DS204/R, adopted 2 April 2004. 
3    Panel Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services (US – Gambling), 
WT/DS285/R, adopted 10 November 2004; Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of 
Gambling and Betting Services (US – Gambling), WT/DS285/AB/R, adopted 7 April 2005. 
4    Panel Report, China – Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual 
Entertainment Products (China – Publications and Audiovisual Products), WT/DS363/R, adopted 12 August 2009; Appellate Body 
Report, China – Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment 
Products (China – Publications and Audiovisual Products), WT/DS363/AB/R, adopted 21 December 2009. 
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working parties and review bodies, this “hidden” 
governance performs important functions in issue- 
framing, information dissemination, networking, 
norm elaboration and interpretation, and regulatory 
learning, whose effects are greater than often 
conventionally perceived (Lang and Scott, 2009). 
This has been exemplified in the present context by 
the WTO Work Programme on Electronic Commerce 
(WTO, 1998), which despite yielding few tangible 
results (Wunsch-Vincent, 2008), has shown the 
multi-directional impact of digital technologies on 
international trade law and informed the debates 
on likely regulatory responses. 
 
Painting this bright picture of the WTO’s “adaptive 
governance” traits (Cooney and Lang, 2007) and its 
inherent potential to address new developments, 
including far-reaching digitally induced 
transformations,  does  not,  however,  mean  that 
the multilateral trade regime is fit to deal with the 
digital trade challenge. Indeed, there are multiple 
sources of worry and scepticism. 
 
Some relate to the ways WTO rules, in particular 
the GATS provisions, were designed, allowing WTO 
Members to tailor their commitments. Others relate 
to old (pre-Internet) and increasingly unconnected 
to practical reality classifications of goods, services 
and sectors, based upon which these commitments 
were made. Many of the contentious issues, which 
often block e-commerce negotiations, stem from 
more fundamental divergences. The “cultural 
exception” dilemma, which has put the US and 
the EU as the major stakeholders in the opposing 
camps, is the pre-eminent example in this context 
(Burri, 2008; Singh, 2008). 
 
Overall, while the WTO dispute settlement system 
partially clarifies and updates the rules, judicial 
transplants cannot replace political consensus on 
the substance, in particular in a complex and highly 
technical  domain,  such  as  digital  trade.  As  the 
Doha negotiations continue to make little progress, 
the multilateral venue of legal rule-making is being 
seriously undermined and this triggers forum- 
shopping (e.g. WTO, 2011) - bilaterally, regionally 
or through new plurilateral initiatives within clubs 
of countries, unaffiliated to any international 
organisation, such as the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade 
Agreement (ACTA) (Blakeney, 2013). 
This fragmentation of fora and rules is not an 
optimal vehicle for seamless and instantaneous 
data flows and for future-oriented digital trade as 
an important pillar of knowledge economies. 
 
2.2. Where action is needed 
 
Starting small, one can first list those issues that 
have so far been thematised in WTO discussions, 
mostly under the auspices of the WTO Work 
Programme  on  Electronic  Commerce,  but  which 
for various reasons have not been addressed in a 
satisfactory manner leading to a clear-cut solution. 
As noted earlier, the WTO E-Commerce Programme 
has been an important initiative in marking both 
the significance of digital trade and its multiple 
effects upon multilateral trade rules. 
 
It has however failed in “converting thinking into 
action” (Wunsch-Vincent and Hold, 2012: 181). 
Even  on  simple  issues,  such  as  confirming the 
applicability of WTO rules and commitments to 
electronically traded services, no results have 
been achieved at the negotiation table. This 
failure has been somewhat compensated by the 
US – Gambling case,5  which at least clarified that 
the GATS applies to digital services6  but there is 
plenty still to be settled. 
 
There is for instance still no agreement on a 
permanent duty-free moratorium on electronic 
transmissions and their content. The moratorium 
has only been temporarily extended several times; 
the last time for a period of two years following 
a decision taken during the Geneva Ministerial 
Conference in 2011 (WTO, 2011a). In addition, 
there is some disagreement as to the moratorium’s 
exact coverage, in particular whether it also 
applies to the content of the transmissions – that 
is, the songs, videos, or films that are being sold for 
download over the Internet.7 
 
Diverse classification issues have been particularly 
contentious from the very outset of the Work 
Programme  on  E-commerce.  On  the  one  hand, 
WTO Members have so far been unable to agree 
whether  digital  products  traded  electronically 
are goods falling under the GATT, services falling 
under the GATS, or perhaps some other, unique 
category.  To  be  sure,  this  is  not  a  technical 
 
5    See supra note 2. 
6    As also confirmed by China – Audiovisual Products, supra note 3. 
7    Mattoo and Schuknecht (2000) have argued that the debate on the ban on duties may be missing the point, since if a WTO Member 
has made a national treatment commitment for a particular sector, then all discriminatory taxes are already prohibited, and vice 
versa – if there is no national treatment obligation, the state remains free to impose discriminatory internal taxes other than 
customs duties, which again renders the value of the ban small. Mattoo and Schuknecht recommend expansion of the GATS specific 
commitments as a more sensible and efficient way to liberalise electronic commerce. 
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decision but a highly political matter, which may 
have serious implications for all Internet-related 
sectors of the economy. The stakes are high since 
the GATT provides for a much more liberalised 
regime, while the GATS, with its positive list type 
of commitments, permits more flexibility for the 
state, including forms of protectionism. 
 
Even in the unlikely situation that this question 
is settled and the GATS is found to be applicable, 
the question of which specific GATS commitments 
apply – those on audiovisual, value-added or basic 
telecommunications, or computer-related services 
– remains unanswered. Here too, the classification 
of new or existing electronic services under one 
of these categories would mean a completely 
different treatment and a set of corresponding 
obligations ranging from levels of full commitment 
for  value-added  telecommunications  and 
computer-related services to virtually non-existent 
obligations for audiovisual services. Since the 
existing commitments are made on the basis of the 
W/120 list (WTO, 1991) by reference to the Central 
Product Classification (CPC) List in its provisional, 
and now largely outdated, 1991 version, there is 
plenty of room for speculation on the applicability 
of a particular classification category and a great 
deal of uncertainty is generated. The same is true 
for the debates on whether GATS Mode 1 (cross- 
border supply) or Mode 2 (consumption abroad) is 
relevant, on implementation of the principle of 
technological neutrality, and on the applicability of 
the “likeness” test criteria to products and 
services available online and offline. 
 
This is a non-exhaustive list of the unresolved 
questions in the e-commerce domain.8  It is 
nonetheless illustrative of the lack of progress 
even on basic issues, which naturally unmasks 
political disagreement and lack of critical mass to 
endorse a future-oriented digital trade strategy 
under  the  multilateral  framework  of  the  WTO. 
This lack of agreement on the ways forward has 
been felt even under the ITA and the much less 
controversial efforts to expand its coverage (Lee- 
Makiyama, 2011). 
 
While the WTO Work Programme on Electronic 
Commerce is still ongoing and the periodic reports 
claim a “reinvigoration” of the efforts to move 
ahead, progress is extremely slow. There is even 
some anxiety expressed by WTO Members that any 
“update” or change of classification schemes may 
in fact reduce the level of existing commitments 
(Tuthill and Roy, 2012). The situation is exacerbated 
by an unfortunate mismatch between the positions 
of the key stakeholders, the US and the EU, which 
has blocked more expeditious solution-finding so 
far (Burri, 2008; Weber and Burri, 2012). 
 
As noted earlier, the above lists the “leftovers” of 
the WTO Work Programme on E-Commerce. To be 
sure, since the Programme was launched in 1998, the 
picture has changed in many critical respects. The 
significance of digital trade, both in its contribution 
to the economic growth of many countries and the 
preoccupation of governments with digital trade- 
related policies, has grown exponentially (OECD, 
2013; USITC, 2013). New, previously unknown or 
not  fully  developed  technological  applications, 
such  as  mobile  telephony  or  cloud  computing, 
have become important platforms for business and 
innovation with various deep societal implications 
(WTO, 2011b). There is also a new palette of 
measures that inhibit digital trade. A recent review 
conducted by the United States International Trade 
Commission (USITC) compiled a useful taxonomy of 
such measures (2013). Some of them can be grouped 
under the so-called “digital trade localization 
measures”  or  “localization  barriers  to  trade” 
and encompass, among others, requirements for 
localization of data servers, certain local content 
policies,  or  discrimination  against  not  locally 
based digital services or providers. The divergent 
approaches  to  data  privacy  and  IP  protection  – 
both too strong and non-existent (which is equal to 
permission for piracy) that different countries have 
adopted, disrupt digital trade, increase the cost of 
doing business and hinder innovation. 
 
2.3. Sketching ways forward 
 
As signalled at the beginning of this paper, one 
can  identify  two  tiers  of  questions,  which  call 
for different types of WTO reform. The first will 
address the first set of problems as defined above, 
which demand only an incremental adjustment of 
WTO law – in particular in the field of services 
regulation  and  which  can  be  addressed  to  a 
large extent through changes in the modes of 
committing.9   This  adjustment  has  so  far  failed 
due to lack of political consensus. The standstill 
in the WTO in this regard has been compensated 
by bilateral and regional initiatives. The series of 
preferential trade agreements (PTAs) concluded 
 
 
 
8    For full reference, see e.g. Mitchell, 2001; Wunsch-Vincent, 2008. 
9    As opposed to changes in the GATS provisions. 
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by the US with a number of partners since 200410 
has established a template, which addresses some 
of the first-tier questions. This template has been 
replicated  in  other,  non-US,  agreements  (such 
as Australia–Singapore, Chile–Australia, Korea– 
Singapore). A critical element of this approach is 
the adoption of a GATT-like negative list approach 
(i.e. everything is committed for except what is 
excluded), which renders many of the politically 
sensitive and complicated classification debates 
less relevant (Wunsch-Vincent, 2008; Wunsch- 
Vincent and Hold, 2012). 
 
Far-reaching specific GATS commitments could 
possibly address the questions raised in the framework 
of the E-commerce Work Programme appropriately 
too. This is the case, for example, when members 
broadly  schedule  entire  services  sectors  at  the 
two-digit CPC level, covering all existing services 
and also anticipating newly developed ones. This 
is an endeavour that is politically feasible for some 
relevant sectors, such as computer and related 
services. For others, such as audiovisual services, 
the political will is largely absent. 
 
The second tier of more complex, “deeper 
integration” issues, such as privacy, data and 
consumer protection, has also been addressed in 
PTAs (Wunsch-Vincent and Hold, 2012). Some key 
IP questions raised in the digital environment, 
including enforcement and intermediaries’ 
liability, have been taken up (albeit not 
comprehensively) basically providing for a type 
and level of protection similar to those of the US 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) (Okediji, 
2009; Yu, 2013). As the SOPA and PIPA initiatives11 
and ACTA, in its initial form, failed to gain support 
domestically, it is possible to envision that some 
of  their  provisions  will  be  applied  through  the 
PTA channels. Strong counter-pressures are also 
observable, however, as the USTR position on the 
inclusion  of  provisions  on  copyright  limitations 
and exceptions in the TPP reveals.12 
Overall, the existing experiments with PTAs 
provide for some minimal and geographically 
limited harmonisation but they are not capable of 
addressing the key digital trade challenge and of 
ensuring free digital flows globally. On the other 
hand, they prove that trade agreements can be a 
suitable venue for tackling the broader questions 
that digital trade poses. Yet, PTAs are most often 
the result of asymmetrical power bargains – 
developing countries may be seriously 
disadvantaged when striking those deals, adopting 
US–centric models or unwillingly reducing future 
regulatory space in key areas. More recently, 
there has been a growing consensus in different 
constituencies that the umbrella of the WTO 
offers the most appropriate venue to create rules 
if not on all, then at least on critical aspects of, 
digital  trade.  Viewed  from  the  perspective  of 
the WTO as the main pillar of global economic 
law,  meeting  these  challenges  can  be  framed 
as a matter of maintaining the relevance of the 
organisation as well. 
 
There are different paths to achieve this, which 
are related to different legal and above all 
political challenges. 
 
(a)   Continuation and reinvigoration of the WTO 
Work Programme on Electronic Commerce 
 
The WTO Work Programme on E-commerce 
continues to exist and inform the ongoing debates. 
Recently, there have been some attempts at its 
“reinvigoration” (WTO, 2011b and 2011c). Most 
notably,  the  US  and  the  EU  have  put  forward 
some  general  principles  for  e-commerce  (WTO, 
2011b).  Without  prejudice  to  any  existing  rules 
and commitments, these principles are intended 
to function as a basic harmonisation framework to 
be applied by governments and their agencies in a 
technologically neutral manner and integrated into 
future bilateral and multilateral trade disciplines. 
 
 
 
 
 
10  The US agreements reached are with Australia, Bahrain, Chile, Morocco, Oman, Peru, Singapore, the Central American countries, 
and more recently with Panama, Colombia and South Korea. 
11  Respectively, Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA), H.R. 3261, introduced in the United States House of Representatives on 26 October 
2011, and Protect IP Act (Preventing Real Online Threats to Economic Creativity and Theft of Intellectual Property Act, or PIPA), S. 
968, introduced in the United States Senate on 12 May 2011. On 18 January 2012, the English version of Wikipedia and some 7,000 
other websites coordinated a service blackout, or posted links and images in protest against SOPA in an effort to raise awareness. 
Many academics, corporations and civil society representatives also opposed SOPA. Soon afterwards, both the House and Senate bills 
were dropped. 
12  “For the first time in any US trade agreement, the United States is proposing a new provision, consistent with the internationally- 
recognized ‘3-step test’, that will obligate Parties to seek to achieve an appropriate balance in their copyright systems in providing 
copyright exceptions and limitations for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, and research. 
These principles are critical aspects of the U.S. copyright system, and appear in both our law and jurisprudence. The balance sought 
by the U.S. TPP proposal recognizes and promotes respect for the important interests of individuals, businesses, and institutions who 
rely on appropriate exceptions and limitations in the TPP region” See USTR (2012). 
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The principles include: 
1.   transparency for all ICT relevant rules; 
 
2. promotion    of    open    networks,    network 
access and   use,   including   promotion   of 
interoperability; 
 
3.   ensuring unhindered cross-border information 
flows; 
 
4.   no   local   infrastructure   or   local   presence 
requirements; 
 
5. no restriction of foreign participation in ICT 
services sectors, through establishment or 
other means; 
 
6.   efficient   and    non-discriminatory    use    of 
spectrum; 
 
7. legally distinct and functionally independent 
regulatory authorities; 
 
8. unrestricted and unburdensome authorisation 
and licence procedures; 
 
9.   ensuring interconnection; and 
 
10. international  co-operation,  in  particular  for 
bridging the digital divide and increased digital 
literacy. 
 
Subscribing to these principles can be a first and 
an important step in ensuring that a level of legal 
certainty is provided and businesses can engage 
in cross-border digital trade. Agreement on these 
principles among more WTO Members can provide 
a healthy basis for further discussions, as well as 
precluding regulatory races to the bottom or to the 
top in regional and bilateral venues, or in unilateral 
state actions, which have been particularly palpable 
in the case of China (USITC, 2013). 
 
WTO Members could subscribe to these principles 
for instance by agreeing upon a Reference Paper for 
Digital Trade, which would then be included as an 
additional commitment in the respective Members’ 
schedules (Article XVIII GATS). The Reference Paper 
could well be coupled with an Annex or a Protocol, 
which specifies an increased level of commitments 
and how they are applied among the parties (as this 
format worked relatively well for the opening up of 
the telecommunications services sector, Bronckers 
and Larouche, 2008; NFTC, 2012). 
 
(b)   Extension of the ITA 
 
Next to the further-reaching commitments for 
telecommunications services made with the 
Agreement on Basic Telecommunications and the 
Reference Paper, the ITA has been one of the 
significant developments since the conclusion of 
the Uruguay Round and marked a great success for 
the ICT industry. The ITA provides for zero tariffs 
for a number of IT products covering some 97 per 
cent of global trade in these products (presently 
committed to by 76 Members).13  The ITA operates 
on an MFN basis, so that benefits are extended 
to all WTO Members. Since the signing of the ITA 
during the 1996 Singapore Ministerial Conference 
(albeit initially excluding some consumer goods), 
it  has  provided  for  advanced  liberalisation  and 
the increased exchange of IT goods has facilitated 
the rapid pace of innovation in the sector (Lee- 
Makiyama, 2011; WTO, 2013), although not all 
countries have been “winners” and the ITA has 
typically favoured industrialised countries as first- 
movers (Ernst, 2013). 
 
Negotiating the expansion of the ITA has been a 
long process that started soon after its adoption; 
updating it appears particularly urgent now that 
the composition of ICT trade has radically changed 
and  significant parts  of  it  are  not  covered  by 
the ITA (Lee-Makiyama, 2011). Making the ITA 
“future-proof”, however, requires more than an 
extension of its product coverage14 and the number 
of  signatories15   (WTO,  2012).  In  a  post-Internet 
age, the digital economy has changed and made 
other areas of trade policy much more relevant 
– notably, non-tariff barriers (NTBs) and services 
trade  (Lee-Makiyama,  2011).  Remaining  within 
the scope and aim of the ITA, this may involve 
some  minimal  negative  harmonisation,  such  as 
in the field of electromagnetic compatibility and 
interference, as well as including computer-related 
and   telecommunications   services,   which   are 
already  substantially  liberalised  (Lee-Makiyama, 
 
 
13  The ITA is purely a tariff-cutting mechanism. While the Declaration provides for the review of non-tariff barriers, there are no 
binding commitments. There are three basic principles that one must abide by to become an ITA participant: (1) all products listed 
in the Declaration must be covered; (2) all must be reduced to a zero tariff level; and 3) all other duties and charges (ODCs) must 
be bound at zero. 
14  Hindley and Dreyer (2008) have argued that to ensure full product coverage, WTO Members should commit by category on the four- 
digit level and not by product on a six- or eight-digit basis. It should be noted that commitments on the higher, chapter-by-chapter 
basis may be impractical, as they also cover various non-ICT products. 
15  The list of non-participating countries includes several important emerging markets like Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, Russia, 
Mexico and Chile. 
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2011). This will solve some, but not all, problems 
of facilitating trade in the contemporary Internet 
environment. 
 
(c)   Tackling digital trade as part of the TISA 
 
The second possible path for moving ahead and 
making the WTO law a better fit for the digital age 
is through the Trade in Services Agreement (TISA), 
which, in contrast to the ITA, is likely to be designed 
as a plurilateral agreement on a non-MFN basis (i.e. 
non-participating WTO Members do not profit). The 
TISA is meant to provide deeper market access in 
the services sector, where in fact liberalisation is 
still quite low, despite the substantial gains from 
trade expected. 
 
The TISA has been supported by both the US and the 
EU, and other countries that are part of the group 
“Really good friends of trade in services”, and 
there is some progress already. If one is in search 
of swift solutions, the plurilateral approach may 
make more sense, as it would bind only those states 
that are ready to make the concessions and may 
diminish the cost of bargaining across issue-areas. 
It may also be sensible to address services questions 
as a whole rather than by taking a piecemeal 
approach. It is, for instance, apparent from some 
submissions made during the Doha talks that new 
types of barriers to digital trade, namely the lack 
of access to technology distribution channels and 
information networks, have been felt in the areas 
of aviation, tourism, and logistics. Access on a 
commercial basis to information networks, subject 
to transparent, reasonable and objective criteria 
and the elimination of anti-competitive practices 
and unfair competition, have been tabled as a 
prerogative in this context (e.g. WTO, 2001). 
 
Yet, it is fair to point out that the plurilateral 
approach may have negative effects too, as it 
would in fact increase the rule fragmentation and 
consequently reduce rather than enhance legal 
certainty. It is for instance still unclear how TISA 
would relate to the existing specific commitments 
made under the GATS. To be sure, even if some 
agreement were to be reached, a positive-list- 
based TISA operating on a non-MFN basis would still 
fail to deliver a suitable framework for the digital 
economy. Bits are not able to discern diverging 
regulation while crossing borders. 
 
Interested stakeholders have suggested that in 
order to accommodate the reality of seamless 
digital trade flows, it would make sense to adopt 
a negative list type of committing, so that there 
is flexibility as to future innovation in the field of 
digital services. Provisions that relate to the data 
flows must also be framed as “horizontal”, and not 
applied on a sector-by-sector basis, as they affect 
a great number of sectors as part of the networked 
economy (IDEA, 2013). With regard to the increased 
level of measures adopted domestically to protect 
key public interests, such as privacy and national 
security, there has been broad recognition that 
some of them may be legitimate and fully justified. 
Others, however, inhibit digital trade unduly. 
Nation states are still in the process of figuring 
out the appropriate levels of protection and the 
balance  between conflicting objectives, such as 
market innovation and protection of privacy (Brown 
and Marsden, 2013). It has been suggested that a 
“framework convention” may be an appropriate 
construction to deal with these moving targets and 
evolving policy formulation (IDEA, 2013). A 
“framework convention” would provide for legal 
certainty as parties would agree on some binding 
obligations, which can then be renegotiated over 
time (Matz-Luck, 2009); it is however unclear how 
such a tool would fit into the existing WTO 
institutional architecture and processes. 
 
(d)   Creating a discrete Digital Economy Trade 
Agreement 
 
Another more comprehensive and further-reaching 
approach would be to create a specifically dedicated 
Digital Economy Trade Agreement (DETA). This is a 
broader undertaking, which would tackle all issues 
related to digital trade. The DETA would cover all 
the first and second “deep integration” tiers of 
questions, as raised and discussed earlier under a 
separate cover, possibly under a plurilateral design. 
To fully realise the benefits of digital trade, it 
would make sense to ensure that “critical mass” is 
achieved and a substantial part of trade is covered, 
as well as that that the core MFN principle of free 
trade and of the WTO is preserved. Focusing on 
selected digital trade relevant sectors may 
facilitate reaching a political consensus and 
agreeing upon a negative list scheduling, as opposed 
to under the TISA “all-services-included” approach. 
While some groups, such as the NFTC (2012), have 
mentioned a DETA as an option capable of 
addressing the challenges of digital trade, it is 
hard to envision at this stage that a DETA will gain 
sufficient support considering the TISA 
negotiations running in parallel. If TISA fails to 
deliver, however, DETA remains a viable fall-back. 
 
3. Conclusion and recommendations 
 
By looking at the available data, which shows the 
ever increasing contribution of the digital economy 
to growth and development, prioritisation of this 
topic in any international trade negotiations is well 
 
justified. While the benefits of digital trade are now 
better understood and largely acknowledged, there 
is still a lack of deep understanding of the workings 
of Internet-based commerce and what changes are 
necessary to the existing international trade rules, 
so that it can thrive. Two elements must be stressed 
in this context and these are the availability of 
interoperable networks without undue constraints 
to doing business and the possibility for data to flow 
over these networks in the least restrictive manner 
feasible (IDEA, 2013). WTO law, as discussed above, 
provides some remedies to both these essential 
elements of digital trade. However, there are many 
challenges, which are not addressed at all or not 
appropriately so. 
 
Against the backdrop of the preceding analysis of 
the present state of affairs, the number one priority 
seems to be the demand for an increased level of 
legal certainty for those businesses engaged and 
willing to engage in digital trade. This will involve, 
at a minimum, a clear recognition that all WTO 
rules apply to online trade in goods and services as 
well as an extension of the duty-free moratorium 
or making it permanent. 
 
The classification jungle is particularly detrimental 
to legal certainty and predictability. WTO Members’ 
political will must be mobilised to overcome old 
 
divergences and move towards future-oriented 
services regulation. The negative list approach is 
strongly advised; as a less optimal alternative, 
commitments at a two-digit CPC level can be 
made, possibly using updated versions of the CPC. 
 
The wave of new-generation barriers to digital 
trade,  including  localisation  requirements  and/ 
or undue privacy, IP, and security requirements 
(USITC, 2013) must be adequately addressed. While 
the national sensitivities are clearly recognisable 
and partially justified,  regulatory activism should 
be disciplined. WTO Members should, as a  
minimum,  commit  to  the  general  principles of  
e-commerce  as  elaborated  by  the  US  and the 
EU (WTO, 2011b) and seek their effective 
implementation. 
 
The formula for realising these objectives is still 
open. The PTA experiences must be carefully 
analysed to see what works better and what is 
absolutely indispensable for contemporary Internet 
commerce. The TPP and TTIP negotiations may 
provide  more  ambitious  and  detailed  templates 
for digital economy rules, which can then be 
multilateralised. The debate must however go 
beyond a search for a solution, which accommodates 
the demandeurs (typically the US, the EU and 
Japan) but also adequately engages developing 
countries and emerging economies. 
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